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Abstract 
In recent years the problem of the determination of causality has become an 
increasingly important question in the field of corporate governance. This paper reviews 
contemporary literature on the topic and finds that the current approach is to attempt to 
determine causality empirically and that the problem remains unresolved. After explaining 
the reasons why it is not possible to attempt to determine causality using real world data 
without falling prey to a logical fallacy, this paper discusses an approach to deal with the 
problem. In particular, the paper argues that the appropriate approach for the problem is to 
build theories, with causality featuring as a part of those theories, and then to test those 
theories both for logical and empirical consistency.  
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We consider several explanations for the results, but the data do not allow strong 
conclusions about causality … These multiple causal explanations have starkly 
different policy implications and stand as a challenge for future research. The 
empirical evidence of this paper establishes the high stakes of this challenge. If an 11.4 
percentage point difference in firm value were even partially “caused” by each 
additional governance provision, then the long-run benefits of eliminating multiple 
provisions would be enormous. (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, p. 145). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The practical goal that corporate governance scholars pursue when studying corporate 
governance questions is to aid both public and private decision makers to improve 
corporate governance. Evidently, to achieve this objective they first need to establish 
exactly what needs to be done in order to ameliorate the current state of affairs. Thus, 
scholars search for the “regularities”, the “laws” and the “causes” that determine 
governance phenomena because decision makers need to enhance corporate governance 
and the gains in economic efficiency from this improvement are potentially very large. 
Recent corporate governance research, specially work that focuses on studying the 
relationship between governance indexes1 and firm valuation has consistently found a 
significantly negative correlation between different measurements of these variables 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Chi and Lee, 2010; 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang, 2013; Cremers and Ferrell, 2014). Unfortunately, however, as 
Bebchuk et al. (2013, p. 343) have recently observed, “these findings do not resolve the 
causality questions –which the literature has generally been unable to resolve– concerning 
the extent to which governance provisions directly cause or merely signal worse 
performance of the firms having them.” Since the potential gains in economic efficiency 
                                                            
1 Corporate governance indexes are constructed in such a way that a higher score indicates more restrictions 
on shareholder rights or a larger number of anti-takeover provisions. 
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that could be derived from settling this issue may well be enormous it is clear that more 
work needs to be done in this area (Gompers et al., 2003). 
  In view of this situation, the contribution of this paper consists in drawing attention to 
an appropriate approach to deal with the problem of causality. The argument is based on the 
distinction between the “real world” and the “world of theory.” After explaining the reasons 
why it is not possible to attempt to determine causality using real world data without falling 
prey to a logical fallacy, this paper argues that the appropriate approach to the problem is to 
first build theories, with causality appearing as a part of those theories, and then to test 
those theories both for logical and empirical consistency. The theory that survives the tests 
and is preferred by scientists resolves the causality question temporarily until it is replaced 
by a better theory (cf. Dubin, 1978, pp. 12-14).  
In this paper we will limit our analysis to scholarly articles that use indexes of 
corporate governance provisions2 and that study the relationship of such indexes with firm 
valuation for two reasons. First, according to the authors of these studies the solution of the 
problem of causality would likely allow decision makers to adopt appropriate policies and 
thereby secure important economic efficiencies. And second, because in this body of 
research the answer to important corporate governance questions seems closer to hand as 
these articles have been generally consistent in finding similar empirical results. This can 
be contrasted with other types of corporate governance research for which the empirical 
findings have been notably inconsistent.3 Although for brevity we do not consider these 
                                                            
2 In particular, the “G-index” created by Gompers et al. (2003) and the “E-index” developed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). 
3 In particular, see the opposing results in the literature that examines ownership structure and its relation to 
firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Mork, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Coles, Lemmon and Meschke, 2012) or the conflicting results 
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other kinds of studies explicitly in this paper, the argument on how to deal with causality 
discussed below is also applicable to their respective cases. 
Moreover, to further delimit the subject matter of this paper we call attention to the fact 
the causality properly understood is not equivalent to simultaneity/endogeneity, and that 
therefore it is not possible to deal with the problem of causality using simultaneous 
equation methods. The classic definition of causality, which we use to guide our discussion 
in this paper, is: the relation between two variables or events that occur in a particular 
sequence, where the second event is the consequence of the first i.e. a sequential, one-way 
cause and effect relationship. On the other hand, simultaneity or codetermination is usually 
defined as a two-way flow of influence between variables that occurs at the same time. 
Thus, causality and simultaneity are different concepts. As is well known, simultaneous 
equation methods are used to deal with the latter concept, and not with the former, when 
there are theoretical reasons to believe that two or more variables affect each other 
simultaneously. In addition, note that the two concepts are incompatible and can be viewed 
as rivals, as it has transpired that influential theorists have endeavored to substitute one 
concept for the other in key areas of economic and financial theory.4 Hence, from the start 
it is evident that it is incorrect to believe that the problem of causality (in its classical sense) 
can be dealt with using simultaneous equation methods, and for this reason we do not 
review papers that claim to resolve causality questions through the use of such methods.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in the literature that studies the size and composition of the board of directors and its effect on performance 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Fosberg, 1989; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). For an in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the mixed results in the corporate 
governance literature see Saravia (2014).  
4 See, for instance, Stigler (1946, p. 181) who criticizes Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk for rejecting the concept of 
simultaneity and preferring the concept causality for theoretical work. Note that at the time of Stigler’s 
writings his position, i.e. spurning causality, was the popular one among philosophers of science. Ironically, 
some three decades later the concept of causality was once again regarded as fundamental to science by most 
philosophers of science (Stewart, 1979, pp. 65-66).   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the problems 
with the current approach to deal with the issue of causality in corporate governance studies 
and argues that it is inadequate to resolve the causality question. Section 3 then discusses 
the proposed approach to the problem of causality. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. CAN CAUSALITY BE ESTABLISHED USING REAL WORLD DATA? 
In this section we consider the issue concerning whether causality can be established 
through empirical work. After reviewing the empirical literature that examines direction of 
causality between governance indexes and firm valuation in section 2.1, we conclude in 
section 2.2 that causality cannot be established using real world data. 
 
2.1.The debate on the direction of causality 
The debate on the direction of causality between indexes of corporate governance 
provisions and firm valuation starts with the seminal paper by Gompers et al. (2003). These 
authors construct for the first time a very useful governance index of corporate governance 
provisions, which they call “G”, which has been often used in corporate governance studies 
ever since. In this work, Gompers et al. maintain that available theory provides them with 
no clear prediction on the relationship between governance provisions and firm valuation. 
They recognize that governance provisions give more power to the management vis-à-vis 
the shareholders. However, they argue that if the management uses this power judiciously 
this can benefit the shareholders, while on the other hand, if management uses this power 
for their own benefit then the governance provisions would hurt shareholders. They 
conclude that from the theoretical perspective there is no obvious answer to this issue and 
that therefore in their paper they ask an empirical question. After conducting their empirical 
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tests, they find a negative correlation between G and firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s 
Q.5 Importantly however, they argue that their data does not allow them to reach a 
conclusion about causality, that is, whether high G scores cause low Tobin’s Qs or vice 
versa.  
Following the results in Gompers et al. (2003), one of the first papers that presents an 
empirical test that aims to shed some light on the direction of causality between a 
governance index and firm valuation is by Bebchuk et al. (2009).6 One key contribution of 
Bebchuk et al. is the creation of a more refined governance index which is based solely on 
those governance provisions which entrench management, which they call the 
“entrenchment index” or “E index”. Similarly to Gompers et al., they also find a negative 
correlation between their governance index and firm valuation, and likewise they realize 
that “a finding of correlation… is subject to different possible interpretations” and that “our 
results… do not enable choosing among these interpretations” (p. 786).  Thus, to see if it is 
possible to decide between the several interpretations, they present an empirical test of 
causation which consists in examining whether a firm’s E index in 1990 had a negative 
correlation with Tobin’s Q in the 1998-2002 period. After conducting this test they do find 
a negative correlation between entrenchment and firm value, however they prudently 
conclude that the test does not establish the direction of causation. At best, their test shows 
that the evidence is not inconsistent with causality running from entrenchment to valuation.  
                                                            
5More precisely, industry-adjusted Tobin´s Q. All empirical papers quoted below use industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm valuation. Lehn et al. 2007 use the market to book ratio of assets, but this is 
calculated in the same way as Tobin’s Q is computed in the other papers. 
6 Note that the discussion paper version of Bebchuk et al.’s article, which already featured this empirical test, 
appeared in 2004. 
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On the other hand, not all papers in the literature are as cautious in their conclusions as 
Bebchuk et al. (2009). For instance, much stronger claims are made in the paper by Lehn et 
al. (2007) regarding the prospect of determining the direction of causality through the 
statistical examination of real world data. Among other things, these authors claim that 
their findings of (a) a significant correlation between firm valuation measures during 1980-
1985 and both the G and the E indexes during the 1990s, and (b) a negative correlation 
between both the G and the E indexes and lagged measures of firm valuation but no 
correlation between the indexes and subsequent measures of firm valuation,7 show that 
causality runs from firm valuation to governance indexes and not vice-versa. As we discuss 
below, such strong conclusions do not follow necessarily from the premises in their 
arguments. 
In an interesting article Chi and Lee (2010) hypothesize that the relationship between the 
E and G indexes (as well as other governance mechanisms) and firm valuation is a function 
of potential agency conflicts which they proxy using free cash flow. Thus, while on the one 
hand they find that among firms with high free cash flow Tobin’s Q is higher for firms with 
fewer governance provisions, on the other, they find that among firms with low free cash 
flow the relation between governance indexes and firm valuation is less strong or 
insignificant. Moreover, based on the work of nineteenth century philosopher and political 
economist John Stuart Mill they attempt to tackle the problem of causality by observing 
that: 
                                                            
7 The statistical results presented in Lehn et al. (2007) suggest that this assertion is not fully accurate, there are 
several instances in which a governance index is also significantly correlated to subsequent measures of firm 
valuation. Additionally, the authors assert that the correlation between firm valuation and contemporaneous 
values of the governance indexes vanishes after controlling for valuation in 1980-1985, however, their Table 
1 on p. 912 shows that the mean coefficient on the G index is still significant at the 1% level after controlling 
for valuation in 1980-1985. 
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According to Mill …, one can conclude that the cause causes the effect if (1) the cause 
precedes the effect, (2) the cause is related to the effect, and (3) there is no other 
explanation other than the cause. We address the first two criteria by lagging the 
governance variables with respect to Q and by documenting the significant statistical 
and economic relation between the governance variables and Q. The third criterion 
presents a tremendous impediment to most governance studies. (Chi and Lee, 2010, p. 
357). 
After performing this test, the authors conclude that causality likely runs from the 
governance indexes and other governance mechanisms to firm valuation and not vice-versa. 
However, they also correctly point out that they cannot rule out the possibility that there 
may be other factors driving the results. 
Finally, in a recent article, Cremers and Ferrell (2014) find a significant negative 
correlation between year-end firm valuation and lagged G-index for the 1978-2006 period. 
Importantly, the authors also find that the significant negative correlation only occurs after 
1985 when the Delaware Supreme Court backed the adoption of antitakeover provisions by 
U.S. boards of directors in the momentous case of Moran v. Household. From these results 
they conclude that the evidence is consistent with causation running from governance 
indexes to firm valuation. On the other hand, they investigate whether causality runs from 
firm valuation to governance indexes as argued by Lehn et al. (2007). Specifically, they 
examine whether lagged Tobin´s Q is a good predictor of future changes in G or the 
decision to implement or remove a poison pill. Their results suggest that a low Tobin’s Q is 
not a very good predictor of increases in the G-index and only a modestly good predictor of 
the adoption of a poison pill. Hence, they conclude that the proposition that causality runs 
from valuation to governance is not supported by the data (p. 1193). Nevertheless, they do 
recognize that their results do not “prove that causation necessarily runs from governance 
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to firm value given the possibility of changes in unobserved firm characteristics driving the 
association” (p. 1194).   
In sum, after reviewing several important attempts to determine the direction of causality 
through empirical tests, it is apparent that the literature has not been able to resolve, or 
reach consensus on, the problem of causality regarding the correlation between governance 
indexes and firm valuation. While some papers find that causality likely runs from 
governance to firm valuation, others find that it runs in the opposite direction. 
 
2.2. Discussion 
To conduct our discussion on the empirical literature on causation above, we need first 
to revisit the definition of a “fallacy” in the sense given to the term by the logicians. A 
fallacy is simply an “argument in which the premises do not lead necessarily to the stated 
conclusion”. Note that this does not mean that a fallacious argument is necessarily wrong, 
rather it means that the fallacious argument is not necessarily right (Stewart, 1979, p. 20, 
emphasis in the original). With this definition in mind our argument in this section is that 
the empirical tests that aim to determine the direction of causality discussed above 
implicitly rest on the fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc or “after this, therefore 
because of this.” This fallacy consists in “assuming that because event B happens after 
event A, then event B is necessarily caused by event A” (Stewart, 1979, p. 24, emphasis in 
the original).  
Thus, if a piece of research claimed that since low valuation precedes high scores in 
governance indexes (or vice versa) this reflects that the former necessarily causes the later, 
then this research would be falling prey to the post hoc fallacy. Now, the fact that the 
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causality tests discussed above implicitly rest on an argument in which the premises do not 
lead necessarily to the stated conclusion is clearly recognized in the literature, and this has 
prevented researchers from fully falling into the trap of the post hoc fallacy. For instance, 
Lehn et al. (2007, p. 908, n.1) state in a footnote that “the test cannot rule out the possibility 
that a third variable affects both valuation multiples and governance indices.” However, 
awareness of this circumstance has not deterred some of the authors using such empirical 
tests from making strong claims about the direction of causality, and it has not prevented 
most researchers from using empirical tests based on such fallacy in an attempt to 
determine the direction of causality.  
Furthermore, while some of the papers reviewed assume that the cause will precede the 
effect, it is important to highlight that it is not impossible that the effect could precede the 
cause, especially when considering the phenomena of the sciences that deal with human 
actors. For instance, Joseph P. McKenna has proposed the following interesting proposition 
which is clearly absurd and is designed to disprove the assertion that the cause will always 
precede the effect: “In the Western economies, there is typically a large upsurge in the 
amount of currency in circulation in the few weeks before Christmas. Therefore, the 
occurrence of Christmas is caused by the rise in currency circulation” (McKenna, quoted in 
Stewart, 1979, p. 201). 
In sum, based on the insight that the basis for the empirical tests of causality reviewed 
above is fallacious, we conclude that such tests are not adequate to resolve the problem of 
causality, and that this problem will become a persistent feature of the corporate 
governance literature unless a different approach is adopted. 
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3. HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY 
Having argued that the current methods used in the literature to deal with the problem 
of causality are inadequate, in this section we concentrate on the main contribution of this 
paper, which consists in drawing attention to an appropriate approach to deal with the 
problem of causality. To understand our proposed method, it is important to remember in 
the first place that causality belongs in the “conceptual domain”, that is, it exists in the 
theoretical world as opposed to the empirical world (Stewart, 1979, p. 73). As argued by 
Stewart (1979, p. 65) in the real world “a cause can never be observed.” We may observe 
that on every occasion that a specific kind of event occurs then it is followed by another 
definite type of event, but that is all we can perceive through our senses. If after observing 
the two events we “introduce the notion of ‛cause’, it can only be because we have done so 
out of our own heads.” Hence, if we attempt to discover causality through observation of 
the phenomena of the real world we would be looking in the wrong place. What we need to 
do is to try to determine causality in the theoretical world which, as Dubin (1978, p. 5) and 
other theory-building authorities explain, exists only in the human mind.  
Now, since both theory and causality only exist in the scientists’ heads, it follows that 
the appropriate way to deal with the problem of causality is to build theories with causality 
appearing as a feature of such theories (cf. Stewart, 1979, pp. 65-69). Researchers would 
then try to disprove the different theories using both empirical tests and assessments 
concerning the logical consistency of the theories. The theory that survives the tests and is 
preferred by scientists resolves the causality question temporarily until it is replaced by a 
better theory. Having said this, notice that by the term “theory” we do not mean what 
Sparrowe and Mayer (2011) have referred to as “fragmented theorizing” or “argument by 
12 
 
citation” whereby each “testable proposition” or “hypothesis”8 is taken from different and 
often mutually incompatible arguments. Clearly, such a procedure would not yield a 
coherent causal explanation and furthermore it might create the impression that “the authors 
are engaging in post hoc theorizing, casting about in the literature for a theory that seems to 
fit a given hypothesis or, worse still, one that matches the variables on which they already 
gathered data” (Sparrowe and Mayer, 2011, p. 1101).  
Moreover, by theory we do not exactly mean just a “well-informed conjecture.” More 
precisely, by theory we refer to the result of a process that starts by stating assumptions 
about human behavior, technology, institutions and resources which are reasonably self-
evident, followed by the use logic to deduce not so obvious or even controversial 
conclusions or hypotheses about economic and financial phenomena.9 Importantly, such 
hypotheses can be rejected not only through empirical tests, but also if it can be shown that 
the logic used in their derivation is faulty. That is, if the conclusions or hypotheses do not 
follow from the assumptions, they can be rejected even before the empirical tests are 
carried out. On the other hand, the empirical tests are useful to detect if something is 
missing in the theory or if there may be errors in the chains of logical deduction. If there is 
intersubjective agreement among scientists that the hypotheses of the theory are not 
                                                            
8 According to theory-building experts (e.g. Dubin, 1978) the difference between a testable proposition and a 
hypothesis is that while the former consists of concepts and exists only in the human mind, the latter is 
derived from a proposition by substituting empirical proxies for the concepts in the proposition and 
consequently belongs in the empirical world. For the sake of expediency and to keep our terminology 
consistent with most of the corporate governance literature, in the following discussion we use the word 
“hypothesis” to refer to both concepts. Strictly speaking, however, a proposition can only be tested directly 
using reason, and a hypothesis can be tested directly through empirical tests only.  
9 Research by Saravia and Saravia-Matus (2014) is an example of recent work that follows this criterion. This 
work presents a theory which takes as its starting point the assumptions of Transaction Cost Economics (see 
e.g. Williamson, 2010), and yields a causal explanations and testable propositions concerning the relationship 
between governance mechanisms (corporate governance provisions in particular) and firm valuation. 
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consistent with the empirical facts, then it is likely there is something wrong with the 
theory.  
To return to the issue of causality in corporate governance studies, it is important to 
remember the one advantage that economics and finance have over physical science. While 
the latter deals with unmotivated particles of matter and for this reason the determination of 
causality can be conceptually challenging, in the former it stands to reason that the ultimate 
cause of all phenomena in society and the markets can be found in the activities of 
individuals who act according to their preferences. That is, in economics and finance 
causality runs from preferences to actions to economic and financial phenomena (Rothbard, 
1993). If this notion is accepted, then it is not sensible to argue that one phenomenon (firm 
valuation) causes another phenomenon (governance indexes levels) or vice-versa. What is 
needed instead is a theory that predicts how individuals will act, based on assumed 
preferences (behavioral assumptions), in the face of certain institutional, technological and 
resource conditions. The actions of the individuals determine both firm valuation and the 
height of corporate governance indexes.  
Moreover, if it is accepted that economic and financial phenomena are determined by 
the actions of the individuals, then it is possible to reject some theories in the field of 
corporate governance even before carrying out the empirical tests. For instance, notice that 
corporate governance studies originated from a general dissatisfaction with the assumption 
that corporations maximize wealth (or profits). Clearly, corporations are not individuals, 
such entities have no preferences and do not act. Rather, individuals are the ones who act in 
the name of corporations. Thus, if a theory starts by assuming that corporations maximize 
wealth and that corporations arrange corporate governance mechanisms in such a way that 
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permits the attainment of this goal, then this theory would be assuming away one of the 
main problems in (and the main motivation of) the field of corporate governance. Moreover 
the theory would not be consistent with the view that the relevant phenomena is determined 
by the actions of market participants. Individuals who act in the name of the corporations, 
even if they have a very large ownership stake, maximize utility not wealth. They maximize 
utility (ex-ante) by preferring marginal units of certain goods and setting others aside 
according to their preferences and after taking proper account of the constraints facing 
them. Wealth is just one of these goods. Thus, it is clear that such individuals face a trade-
off between wealth and other goods as is shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In sum, 
the claim that corporations maximize wealth should figure as a conclusion or hypothesis in 
a theory of corporate governance, not as an assumption. This hypothesis would then be 
subject to logical and empirical tests. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Public and private decision makers need and are interested in research that resolves the 
issue of causality and not in work that simply establishes correlations between variables. 
After reviewing the current empirical literature on the causal relationship between 
corporate governance and firm valuation, this paper has explained the reasons why it is not 
possible to attempt to determine causality using real world data without falling prey to a 
logical fallacy.10 Hence, this paper concludes that the appropriate approach to address the 
                                                            
10 Strictly speaking it is not possible to determine causality empirically no matter what empirical methods are 
used (controlled experiments including randomized experiments, econometric methods such as fixed effect 
methods, etc.). This is because in the empirical world one can never completely rule out the possibility that a 
third factor may be driving the results. Moreover, causes are not observable, causes only exist in the 
scientists’ minds (Stewart, 1979, p. 65). Let us remember that the problem of causality originated in 
considering phenomena of the physical and other natural sciences where a level of precision in empirical 
testing is possible which we cannot hope to match in the social sciences. If in these fields of knowledge it is 
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problem of causality in corporate governance research is to build theories, with causality 
featuring as a part of those theories, and then to test those theories both for logical and 
empirical consistency.  
Now, it may be argued that the method advocated in this paper is the one that is 
actually followed in corporate governance research already. However, our review of the 
literature in section 2 suggests otherwise, in particular regarding the case of the relationship 
between governance indexes and firm valuation. Clearly, the intention of the articles we 
have reviewed is to try to determine causality directly through the use of empirical 
methods, as opposed to constructing fully developed theories and reaching conclusions 
about causality based on those theories. We have argued that this is the reason why several 
authors find that the problem of causality remains unresolved. In view of this situation, we 
consider that the clarifications we provide in this paper are important and necessary at this 
point in time in order to ensure future progress in our field of study.   
Lastly, this paper constitutes a reminder on the limits of empirical research and an 
appeal to reestablish a better balance between theory and empirical work. While there are 
certain tasks that can be best achieved through empirical work, there are other tasks, such 
as the determination of causality, which can be accomplished primarily through theoretical 
research. Both kinds of research are complementary and better awareness of their strengths 
and weaknesses will improve the quality and usefulness of corporate governance studies.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
still not possible to determine causality empirically it is not because of problems in performing better 
empirical tests. 
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